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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PlaintiffAppellee, 
v. 
JULIO SOSA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 980173-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998), 
possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (1998), and giving false information to a law enforcement officer, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1995), in the Second Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Pamela Heffernan, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to suppress in concluding 
that the investigating officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective frisk of 
defendant's person, and, thereafter, good cause to remove a drug container of 
characteristic shape, size and feel from defendant's pocket? "The trial court's factual 
findings underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are 
examined for clear error." State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). "Findings of fact are clearly erroneous 
only if they are not adequately supported by the record." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 
137, 140 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996)). 
However, "[a] trial court's determination of reasonable articulable suspicion is a 
conclusion of law, reviewed for correctness." Id. (citing State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 
1183, 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). "Nevertheless, the nature of this particular 
determination of law allows the trial court 'a measure of discretion . . . when applying 
that standard to a given set of facts.'" Case. 884 P.2d at 1276 (citing Pena. 869 P.2d at 
939). The same standards are applied to the trial court's probable cause determination. 
See State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997). 
2. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion for a new trial alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel? "Where the trial court has heard and ruled on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, [the reviewing] court is 'free to make an 
independent determination of a trial court's conclusions.'" State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 
1113, 1119 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990). "The factual findings underlying the trial court's conclusions will not be set 
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aside unless they are clearly erroneous." IdL (citing Templin. 805 P.2d at 186). In 
order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must first show 
that counsel's performance was deficient and then show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are attached at 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Julio Sosa, was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute (Count I), possession of marijuana (Count II), and giving false information to a 
law enforcement officer (Count III) (R. 1-3). Defendant moved pretrial to suppress 
evidence discovered during a warrantless search, and, following an evidentiary hearing, 
the trial court denied the motion (R. 33-41; 208:81-88). Following a jury trial, defendant 
was convicted on all counts (R. 208:134-36). The trial court sentenced defendant to 
statutory terms of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (Count I), 180 days in jail 
(Count II), and 90 days in jail (Count III), the terms to be served concurrently with each 
other and consecutively to the prison sentence defendant was currently serving (R. 145). 
Defendant moved for a new trial, and, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied the motion (R. 146-50, 171-72). Defendant timely appealed (R. 175). Upon 
3 
the belief that defendant had been convicted of a first degree felony, this Court transferred 
the case to the Utah Supreme Court, which thereafter poured the case back over to this 
Court (R. 190, 197). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Motion to Suppress1 
On March 26, 1996 in Ogden, Utah, Sergeant Bed Malmborg of the Odgen City 
Police Department clocked with radar equipment a brown Chrysler traveling at 46 miles 
per hour in a 35 mile an hour zone (R. 208:60). When Sergeant Malmberg signaled the 
car to stop, it pulled to the curb but continued to roll, then made a slow right turn at the 
corner and traveled another 150 feet before finally coming to a stop (R. 208:61). 
1
 The facts are recited most favorably to the trial court's findings. State v. 
Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997) ("Because we are reviewing the trial 
court's decision denying defendant's motion to suppress, we recite the facts in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings.") (citing State v. Montoya. 937 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1997)). 
2
 Looking to accentuate the alleged ineffectiveness of Mr. Boyle, defendant's trial 
counsel, defendant asserts through innuendo that Mr. Boyle negligently failed to 
subpoena any witnesses at the suppression hearing. Br. of App. at 10. In fact, because 
the search at issue was conducted without a warrant, the burden of going forward was on 
the prosecution to show the search was nonetheless reasonable. See State v. Marshall, 
791 P.2d 880, 886-87 (Utah App. 1990) (noting that although the ultimate burden is on 
the defendant to show that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, "the burden is on 
the State, in the first instance, to show that a warrantless search is lawful") (citations 
omitted). The prosecutor fulfilled this burden by calling Sergeant Michael Ashment of 
the Ogden City Police Department to testify concerning his traffic stop of defendant (R. 
208:3, 33). Furthermore, it was defense counsel, and not the prosecutor, who called 
Officer Malmberg to testify (R. 208:3, 60). 
4 
Throughout this period, the two occupants moved back and forth, appearing to Sergeant 
Malmberg to be hiding something (R. 208:61). When the car finally stopped moving, 
Sergeant Malmberg approached the driver and asked for identification (R. 208:61). 
The driver, who first identified himself as "Frank John Sosa/9 but was later 
discovered to be Mark Wayne Cruz, had no identification (R. 44,208:61). Sergeant 
Malmberg then asked the driver to step out of the car and directed him to the back of the 
car (R. 208:61). After discovering there was an outstanding warrant on Cruz, Sergeant 
Malmberg arrested him (R. 33-34, 44). Asked about his passenger's identity, Cruz said 
his name was "Lee" (R. 44, 208:62). However, the passenger, who was actually 
defendant Sosa, identified himself as "Willie Cruz" (R. 44, 208:13, 47, 62). Based on his 
suspicions that the driver was lying about who he was and the driver's actions and 
mannerisms, Sergeant Malmberg handcuffed him and called Sergeant Ashment, who he 
knew to be in the vicinity, for backup (R. 208:61-62). 
While talking to the passenger (defendant), Sergeant Malmberg noticed an opened 
.22 long rifle ammunition box sitting on the console between the front seats (R. 208:62-
63, 67). When Sergeant Ashment arrived, Sergeant Malmberg quickly (about 30 
seconds) explained his reasons for arresting Cruz, telling him about car's continued 
movement even after it started to pull over, the occupants furtive movements in appearing 
to pass or hide something, his seeing an open box of bullets, and his belief that both 
defendant and the driver were lying to him and that they either had a gun in the car or on 
5 
their persons (R. 208:42, 47, 49, 62-63).3 
Based on what Sergeant Malmberg told him, Sergeant Ashment felt sufficient 
concern for his safety to patdown defendant for weapons when defendant stepped out of 
the car (R. 208:43,49). Sergeant Ashment patted down defendant's outer clothing for 
weapons, including the area around defendant's waistband where, on previous occasions, 
he had found pocket knives, but did not find any weapons (R. 208:43-44, 51, 54-55). 
However, while patting down defendant in the area of his waistband, a common place for 
hiding narcotics, Sergeant Ashment felt in the right side coin pocket an object, which, 
from his seven-year experience in investigating narcotics, he immediately recognized 
from its size and texture as an "8-ball"- a round object, smaller than a quarter in diameter, 
containing one-eighth ounce of a controlled substance in a powdered form, generally 
either cocaine or methamphetamine, secured in the bottom comer of a sealed plastic bag 
(R. 208:39, 44-46, 55-58).4 
3
 Sergeant Malmberg testified that .22 long rifle ammunition can also be fired 
from a .22 caliber pistol (R. 208:65-66). During a search of the car when it was 
subsequently impounded, police found in jacket a .22 caliber long rifle pistol and forty-
three rounds of ammunition (R. 45, R. 208:67-68). An NCIC check of the weapon was 
unsuccessful because the serial number had been filed off the gun (R. 45). 
4
 Testifying as to his experience in narcotics investigation, Sergeant Ashment 
stated that he had been with the Ogden City Police Department for ten years. Prior to his 
promotion he was a detective assigned to the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force for 
three years, during which time he managed over two hundred narcotics cases (R. 208:33-
35). Prior to that assignment he was a detective with the Major Crimes Unit, in 
conjunction with which he also investigated narcotics offenses (R. 208:35-36). In these 
assignments he regularly saw controlled substances and learned how they were packaged, 
6 
Sergeant Ashment removed from defendant's pocket the object, which, as he had 
surmised, was an 8-ball of either cocaine or methamphetamine (R. 208:45-46). From the 
time Sergeant Ashment approached the passenger's side of the vehicle until his discovery 
of the 8-ball, was about two or three minutes-or within three minutes of his arrival (R. 
208:47-48). Continuing his search, Sergeant Ashment found on defendant's person two 
packages of powdered cocaine and one package of cocaine base-crack cocaine (R. 45, 
208:18). When defendant was later searched at the jail, police also discovered one-eighth 
ounce of marijuana hidden in his shoe (R. 45,208:19). 
looked, and felt (R. 208:36). While with the Strike Force, he continually received 
specific training in the identification of controlled substances (R. 208:36). He also 
graduated from Weber State University with a bachelor's degree in criminal justice, part 
of which curriculum consisted of annual narcotics identification courses. Sergeant 
Ashment was also a member of the Utah Narcotics Association, from which he received 
annual training (R. 208:36-37). As a Category-1 officer and in order to maintain his 
certification, Sergeant Ashment also received annual training in the review of case law in 
the area of narcotics trafficking (R. 208:37). Further, as part of his state certification as a 
narcotics clandestine laboratory investigator and narcotics detector dog handler, Sergeant 
Ashment had experience observing and handling various types of illegal drugs (R. 208: 
37-38). Also, in his regular preparation and execution of search warrants, Sergeant 
Ashment observed "many times" how controlled substances in Weber County were 
commonly packaged (R. 208:38). In particular, Sergeant Ashment was familiar with an 
"8-ball," a slang reference for a one-eighth ounce of narcotics, which is a common size in 
the packaging of cocaine (R. 208:38-39). Through his training and experience, Sergeant 
Ashment also had the opportunity to observe not only the size of an 8-ball, but also its 
most popular method of packaging, to wit: containment of the powdery controlled 
substance in the bottom corner of a plastic bag which is then cut and then sealed by tying 
or applying heat (R. 208:39-40). Finally, Sergeant Ashment testified that he had taught 
other officers narcotics identification, as well as common narcotics trafficking patterns as 
an instructor at Weber State POST Academy, civic groups and local police departments in 
the area (R. 208:40). 
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Defendant was placed under arrest (R. 208:46). When defendant arrived at the 
Weber County Jail, one of the jailers identified defendant as "Julio Sosa" (R. 208:46-47). 
On these facts, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding that 
Sergeant Ashment had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant might be armed 
and dangerous and that the circumstances justified a Terry-frisk (Ruling on Motion to 
Suppress, "Ruling," R. 208:81-88, at 81-82, attached at Addendum B).5 The trial court 
further found that, based on his extensive experience with narcotics, Sergeant Ashment 
felt an object he immediately recognized as typically containing controlled substances, 
justifying its removal from defendant's pocket (R. 208:83-86). 
Trial 
Trial took place on three days (R. 77-81). On August 16, 1996, the first day of 
trial, Sergeants Malmberg and Ashment testified to substantially the same facts as they 
had at the suppression hearing regarding the stop of the car defendant was riding in, the 
officers' concern for their safety based on defendant's and Cruz's conduct and the 
discovery of the ammunition box, the search of defendant's person uncovering controlled 
substances, Sergeant Ashment's expertise in narcotics recognition, and the nature of the 
contraband found (R. 208:116-143, 146-60, 175-85).6 
5
 See Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. L 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). 
6
 Additionally, Sergeant Ashment testified that although he had personally 
managed about two hundred cases while with the Narcotics Strike Force, he had assisted 
in six hundred to seven hundred cases (R. 208:142). He also more specifically testified 
8 
Additionally, the prosecution sought to have Sergeant Ashment and Lieutenant 
Chris Zimmerman qualified as expert witnesses to assist the jury in understanding how all 
the circumstances surrounding defendant's possession of contraband bore on his intent to 
distribute (R. 208:143-45, 166-69). Defense counsel, Michael J. Boyle, objected on 
various grounds, including that he had not been given the required 30-day notice, but 
apparently cited to the trial court Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (1995), which requires a 30-
day notice for mental health experts, rather than Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995), 
which requires a 30-day notice for experts in felony cases (R. 208:169-72). The trial 
court allowed the prosecution to present the officers ac expats, expressing concern that 
they not testify directly to the ultimate issue of defendant's intent (R. 208:169-72). 
Notwithstanding Sergeant Ashment's qualification as an expert, the prosecutor did 
not attempt to elicit any testimony from him on direct examination concerning a 
relationship between the nature of the drugs found on defendant and defendant's intent to 
distribute (R. 208:140-185). However, on cross-examination and in accord with the 
theory of the defense, Mr. Boyle attempted to elicit from Sergeant Ashment that the two 
bags of powdered cocaine and the 8-ball found on defendant's person, suggested 
defendant was a heavy personal user purchasing from several different sources, rather 
than a drug dealer (R. 208:188,194-95, 197-202). Sergeant Ashment answered that he 
that he found on defendant's person three additional ziplock bags, one containing a half 
gram and the other about 1.7 gram (one-sixteenth ounce) of powdered cocaine, 
respectively, and the other containing a solid "rock" of crack cocaine (R. 208:157, 202). 
9 
found no evidence that defendant was a drug user and that it was not common for a heavy 
cocaine user to carry different sizes of cocaine packaged differently (R. 208:192-93). He 
further stated that an 8-ball is not as common for personal use as a one-sixteenth ounce or 
less, and most drug users who do not deal drugs cannot afford to buy cocaine in a quantity 
as great as an 8-ball (R. 208:159, 196). Further, while Sergeant Ashment acknowledged 
that a cocaine addict might buy cocaine from more than one dealer, it was unlikely that an 
addict would be in possession of as many different packets as defendant was in this case, 
nor had he ever seen anyone service a cocaine habit for a week by buying five small (half 
gram) packets (R. 208:198-99). 
Chris Zimmerman, a lieutenant in the Ogden City Police Department and 
commander of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force, testified to his extensive 
experience in narcotics interdiction (R. 208:203-06).7 Having reviewed the case, 
7
 Prior to his becoming commander, Lieutenant Zimmerman was the field 
supervisor of the Strike Force, a position which he held for four years and in which he 
supervised agents executing drug buys directly or through informants and the writing of 
reports, reviewed and prepared cases going to court, and actively participated in 
numerous narcotics cases (R. 208:204-05). Prior to that assignment, Lieutenant 
Zimmerman was a field supervisor of the patrol division, and for eight years prior to that 
he was a detective in the vice squad investigating major crimes, which "almost always" 
involved him in narcotics cases (R. 208:205-06). He was graduated from what was then 
Weber State College with a degree in police science and graduated first in his POST 
academy class in 1980 (R. 208:206). Since that time he had attended the DEA Narcotics 
School, the DEA Narcotics Task Force Commander School, the Utah Police Officers 
Standard and Training Narcotics Investigator School, and numerous other schools dealing 
with narcotics (R. 208:206). He regularly taught basic drug identification, narcotics 
investigation and search and seizure (R. 208:206). He had been qualified as an expert in 
narcotics cases in both federal and Utah state courts (R. 208:207). 
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Lieutenant Zimmerman first stated that it would be unusual for a mere user of cocaine to 
have in his possession an 8-ball, a one sixteenth ounce ("teener")* a half gram, and crack 
cocaine (R. 208:210-11). He based his conclusion on how uneconomical the purchase of 
a teener and a half gram of cocaine would be compared with purchase of an 8-ball, a 
substantially greater amount of controlled substance for only slightly greater cost (R. 
208:211-12). Secondly, he noted that because powdered cocaine and crack cocaine 
produced a "high" of such different intensity in such different times, the drugs appealed 
to different addictive tastes, and it would, therefore, be unlikely that a cocaine user would 
possess both the powdered and crack form (R. 208:212-14). Next, he testified that 
because purchasing and repackaging an 8-ball in various smaller amounts was profitable 
and increased opportunities for sales to buyers having different sums available to them, it 
would be common for a dealer to possess cocaine repackaged in various amounts (R. 
208:214-16). Lieutenant Zimmerman further noted that because a cocaine dealer requires 
a place secure from outside observers and the vagaries of wind which might blow the 
cocaine powder away before it was cut and repackaged, it would be unusual to find a 
dealer with paraphernalia, i.e., baggies, scales and mirror, in his car (R. 208:216-17).8 
Finally, he observed that because addiction demands use, one would not find a heavy 
user in possession of cocaine without paraphernalia to use it (R. 208:218-19). 
8
 In his earlier cross-examination of Sergeant Ashment, defense counsel elicited 
that police found no paraphernalia, i.e., empty baggies, cutting agents, O-sheets (records 
of drug transactions), or scales, in the car (R. 208:187, 189). 
11 
During an inventory of Cruz's car, police found a .22 caliber pistol with a loaded 
clip and forty-three rounds of ammunition in the pocket of a coat located behind the 
driver's seat; however, no drug paraphernalia was found (R. 208:232-36). Police also 
found a baggy of marijuana in one of defendant's shoes when defendant was booked (R. 
208:242-43).9 
On the second day of trial, August 19, 1996, the trial court excused the jury in 
response to defense counsel's renewed objection to the admission of the State's expert 
testimony for lack of notice required under section 77-17-13, and his motion for a 
continuance (R. 209:290-93). Examining the statute, the trial court agreed with defendant 
that Lieutenant Zimmerman had testified as an expert, and it therefore continued the trial 
for a week to allow defendant to meet Lieutenant Zimmerman's testimony either through 
cross-examination or by bringing in his own expert (R. 209:296-97). The prosecutor 
waived the notice of defendant's prospective expert and the expert's report required by 
section 77-17-13 (R. 209:297-300). Additionally, the trial court also signaled defense 
counsel that it would give him still more time to locate an expert if necessary, and ordered 
Lieutenant Zimmerman be available for cross examination when the trial resumed (R. 
209:300-01). In recognition that pursuant to the statute a continuance was defendant's 
9
 A State criminalist confirmed that all controlled substances taken from 
defendant's pocket were cocaine and weighed very closely to the estimates testified to by 
Sergeant Ashment and Lieutenant Zimmerman, and that the controlled substance found in 
defendant's shoe was marijuana (R. 209:260, 266-74). 
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remedy for failure to receive notice of the State's expert witness, except in the instance of 
bad faith, the trial court specifically found that the prosecution had not acted in bad faith 
(R. 209:301-03). 
When the trial resumed a week later on August 26, 1996, defense counsel called 
Dr. Rick Hawks, Ph.D., a psychologist for Weber Human Services with twenty years 
experience, ten of which involved drug and alcohol abuse (R. 209:305-07). Defense 
counsel also provided the prosecutor with a copy of Dr. Hawks' report, which, in addition 
to other information supporting the defense theory, also contained a nine-year old 
reference to defendant's expressed wish to become wealthy by selling drugs on the street 
(R. 209:320-37, 349, 407-08). After qualifying as an expert in addiction, Dr. Hawks that 
he had interviewed defendant and reviewed files of the Utah State Prison and local 
agencies relating to defendant's history. He then testified at length about factors 
indicating that defendant was not likely a drug dealer and defendant's serious and long-
standing alcohol and drug problem, particularly involving cocaine in its various forms 
and marijuana (R. 209:320-36). 
Notwithstanding Dr. Hawks' testimony, the jury convicted defendant of all 
charged offenses (R. 209:397-98). Defendant, represented by new counsel, moved for a 
new trial, claiming multiple errors of his trial counsel's response to the appearance of the 
State's expert witnesses and his handling of his expert witness, all allegedly constituting 
ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 209:404-26, 442-47). The trial court denied the 
13 
motion (New Trial Ruling, R. 209:454-57, attached at Addendum C). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, 
consisting of a variety of drugs seized from his person. Based on defendant's furtive 
conduct in appearing to hide something before the vehicle he was riding in came to a 
stop, the existence of an outstanding warrant against defendant's companion, the apparent 
lies in defendant's identification of himself, and the presence of an ammunition box, an 
experienced narcotics enforcement officer had a sufficiently reasonable concern for his 
safety to patdown defendant for weapons. In the course of the search, the officer 
immediately and without manipulation felt and then removed from defendant's pocket an 
object which, based on his experience, he knew to be a narcotics container known as an 
M8-ball." Based on this discovery of illegal narcotics, the officer properly searched and 
found other controlled substances on defendant's person. 
POINT II 
The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for a new trial, which was 
based on trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance in inadequately objecting to the 
10
 Facts relating to the new trial motion, including an elaboration of Dr. Hawks' 
trial testimony, which is significant to the evaluation of defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, are more fully developed in the argument portion of this brief. 
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State's expert witnesses and in obtaining and preparing his own expert witness. Contrary 
to defendant's claims, his trial counsel was successful in obtaining a continuance in order 
to obtain an expert to meet the testimony of the State's experts. Thereafter, defense 
counsel obtained a qualified, experienced expert who credibly and at length advanced the 
theory of the defense, that defendant was clearly a drug user and not likely a drug dealer. 
Defendant has failed to show that his trial counsel could have obtained any other expert 
who, in the circumstances of this case, could have testified more favorably for the 
defense. He has also failed to show that the disclosure of remote, somewhat damaging 
statements contained in his expert's report and required by statute to be provided to the 
prosecution was not a necessary element of reasonable trial strategy or that it had any 
prejudicial effect on the outcome of the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT, GIVEN 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE STOP, A PROTECTIVE FRISK 
OF DEFENDANT WAS REASONABLY JUSTIFIED AND THAT 
THE REMOVAL OF A DISTINCTIVELY SHAPED DRUG 
CONTAINER FROM DEFENDANT'S POCKET WAS JUSTIFIED 
UNDER THE "PLAIN FEEL" DOCTRINE 
Defendant first argues that there was no reasonable suspicion warranting a 
protective Terry frisk.11 Even if the frisk was reasonable, he continues, there was no 
1 ]
 Defendant does not challenge the legality of the stop of the vehicle for speeding. 
See State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) ("[A] police officer may stop 
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reasonable basis for the officer's reaching into his pocket and seizing the drugs. Br. of 
App. at 15-20. However, the record supports the investigation officer's reasonable 
concern for his safety with respect to both occupants of the car, justifying a search of 
defendant, which immediately resulted in the "plain feel" of a characteristic drug 
container and its contents, justifying its seizure. Given these circumstances, defendant's 
final point, that even if the drug seizure was lawful his continued detention as the 
passenger was beyond the scope of the justifiable stop of the driver, is simply without 
merit. 
A. Because Sergeant Ashment was Reasonably Concerned for His Safety, 
He was Justified in Conducting a Warrantless Search of Defendant 
"In Michigan v. Long. . . . the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
roadside traffic stops are particularly dangerous when weapons may be present in the area 
immediately surrounding a suspect." Bradford. 839 P.2d at 869 (citing Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1048-50, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480-81 (1983)). "When the safety of the 
police or the public is threatened, the Fourth Amendment permits officers to conduct a 
warrantless search." LI (citing State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990)). 
See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah App. 1990) (protecting police, public 
safety, and preventing destruction of evidence are exceptions to warrant requirement), 
cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). "Therefore, when an officer reasonably believes 
a vehicle when the officer has witnessed the commission of a traffic violation.") (citations 
omitted). 
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a suspect is dangerous and may obtain immediate control of weapons, a protective search 
is justified." Bradford. 839 P.2d at 870 (citing Long. 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S. Ct. at 
348). An officer may conduct a protective weapons search only if ma reasonably prudent 
[person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety or 
that of others was in danger."1 State v. Rovbal. 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986) (quoting 
Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)). 
Additionally, Utah has codified a Terry stop and frisk: 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may 
frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any 
other person is in danger. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1995). 
"The officer must justify a pat down search by 'specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion/" State v. Rochell. 850 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880). "These facts and inferences may be interpreted 'in light of 
[the officer's] experience.'" id (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880). It is 
not necessary that the officer be certain that the suspect has access to a weapon. State v. 
Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1992). "Instead, we consider only 'whether a 
reasonably prudent man in [these] circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety . . . was in danger.'" Id (quoting Terrv. 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883). 
A host of Utah cases have found a Terrv frisk justifiable in circumstances 
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substantially similar to those in this case. See State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 
1983) (reasonable concern for other officers safety justified search and seizure of pistol 
case from suspicious driver who, apparently having earlier lied to officer in denying there 
was a gun in the car, was trying to conceal weapon case); RocheU, 850 P.2d at 483 
(justifiable search of speeding driver, apparently drinking, who upon being stopped left 
the car and approached officer and who had a bulge in his pocket which officer believed 
could have been a weapon); Strickling. 844 P.2d at 982-84 (concern for safety justified 
search of late night burglary suspects, one of whom officer had twice previously arrested, 
reached behind seats while officer waited for backup); Bradford, 839 ?.2z at 871 
("Defendant's speeding, the remote area, the early hour, defendant's apparent shaking as if 
he were Mon something," the presence of a rifle, and defendant's furtive retrieval of a bag 
combine[d] to create a reasonable belief that defendant presented a threat to [the officer's] 
safety.).12 
The circumstances of this case clearly show that the protective search of 
defendant's person was justified: (1) a speeding car was signaled by Sergeant Malmberg 
12
 Defendant cites as support for his claim State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 
1989), in which the court found no reasonable suspicion to open the passenger door of an 
automobile based on the passenger's furtive movements. Br. of App. at 18. Schlosser, 
however is readily distinguishable on several points. First, the officer based his action on 
nothing other than the passenger's furtive movements and nervousness. Id. at 1133-34, 
1137. Second, the opening of the car door constituted a search requiring probable cause, 
not mere reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1137. Third, the officer never stated that he was 
concerned for his safety, but was investigating the possibility that the suspect was 
engaged in criminal activity, for which there was no adequate reasonable suspicion. Id 
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to pull over (R. 208:60-61); (2) before stopping, the car pulled to the curb, but continued 
to roll, made a right turn, and then traveled another 150 feet before coming to a stop (R. 
208:61); (3) throughout this period, the two occupants moved back and forth, appearing 
to be hiding something (R. 208:61); (4) the driver had no license or identification of any 
kind (R. 208:61); (5) upon discovery of an outstanding warrant, the driver was arrested 
and removed to the rear of the car (R. 33-34,44,208:61); (6) asked about his passenger's 
identity, the driver said his name was "Lee;" however, the passenger, who was actually 
defendant, identified himself as "Willie Cruz" (R. 44, 208:13, 47, 62); (7) based on his 
suspicion that the occupants were lying about their identities and their earlier furtive 
movements, Sergeant Malmberg called for backup (R. 208:208:42, 47, 49, 61-63); (8) 
while talking to defendant, Sergeant Malmberg noticed an opened, but empty, .22 long 
rifle ammunition box sitting on the console between the front seats (R. 208:62-64, 67); (9) 
from his personal ownership and use of a .22 long rifle and its ammunition, Sergeant 
Malmberg had "no doubt in his mind" that the box he observed was typical of the 
distinctive box designed for .22 long rifle ammunition (R. 208:64-67); (10) when 
Sergeant Ashment arrived, Sergeant Malmberg explained his reasons for arresting the 
driver, telling him about car's continued movement even after it started to pull over, the 
occupants furtive movements in appearing to pass or hide something, his seeing an open 
box of bullets, and his belief that both defendant and the driver were lying to him and that 
they either had a gun in the car or on their persons (R. 208:42,47,49, 62-63); and (11) 
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based on what Sergeant Malmberg told him, Sergeant Ashment, a police officer with 
extensive experience and knowledge of narcotics enforcement, felt sufficient concern for 
his safety to search defendant for weapons (R. 208:35-40, 43, 49).13 
Having substantially summarized the foregoing statement of relevant facts,14 the 
trial court stated: 
All those factors taken into, into [sic] consideration, considering it 
was on the side of the road, that the officer felt there was either a gun in the 
car or on the person of one of the two, and in giving that information to the 
backup officer [sic] was justified in following the direction and request to 
search the defendant in this case who was the passenger in the vehicle. 
I would consider this based on what I've heard a fairly high level of 
potential danger. And I don't think we have to, that an officer has to wait 
until the gun is either used or brought out to make that determination. 
Without going further into that I think it really speaks to the obvious on 
that. 
(R. 208:82). The trial court's conclusion is clearly correct.15 
13
 A subsequent search of the car uncovered a .22 caliber long rifle pistol and 
forty-three rounds of ammunition (R. 45, R. 208:67-68). An NCIC check of the weapon 
was unsuccessful because the serial number had been filed off the gun (R. 45). 
14
 Defendant does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact regarding 
reasonable suspicion, but rather only its legal conclusion. Br. of App. at 17-19. 
15
 Because, as the trial court noted, the officers' concern for their safety derived 
from the movements and responses of both the driver and the passenger (defendant), and 
the reasonable possibility that either might be armed, defendant's claim that his continued 
detention as the passenger was beyond the scope of the justifiable stop of the driver, see 
Br. of App. at 20-22, is without merit. 
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B, Because the Investigating Officer Felt an Object Which in His 
Experience He Immediately Knew was a Characteristic Type of 
Of Drug Container, the Officer was Justified in Seizing it Under 
The "Plain Feel" Doctrine, 
Defendant argues that even if the Terry frisk was reasonably justified, his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated when the officer seized contraband from his pocket 
which was clearly not a weapon. Remarkably, in making this claim, defendant 
substantially misrepresents the trial court's findings of relevant facts and fails to even cite 
governing law from the United States Supreme Court which was the primary authority 
cited by the prosecution in responding to defendant's motion to suppress and relied on by 
the trial court in making its ruling. 
In Minnesota v. Dickerson. the defendant was seen by police officers exiting a 
known "crack house" and then abruptly changing his direction after having made eye 
contact with one of the officers. Minnesota v. Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366, 368, 113 S. Ct. 
2130, 2133 (1993). Finding the defendant's evasive action in these circumstances 
suspicious, the officers stopped and frisked the defendant, but found no weapons. Id. at 
368-69, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. However, the officer conducting the search took an interest 
in a small lump in the defendant's pocket and, after manipulating it, "felt it to be a lump 
of crack cocaine in cellophane." Id at 369, 113 S. Ct. at 2133. The officer then reached 
into the defendant's pocket and pulled out one fifth of crack cocaine in a small plastic 
bag. Id at 369, 113 S. Ct. at 2133-34. 
21 
The United States Supreme Court ultimately found the search illegal, but 
nonetheless upheld the validity of the "plain feel" or "plain touch" search in appropriate 
circumstances. Dickerson. 508 U.S. at 374-79, 113 S. Ct. at 2137-39. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court first hinged its analysis on Terry: "Terry further held that '[w]hen 
an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is 
investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others/ 
the officer may conduct a patdown search 'to determine whether the person is in fact 
carrying a weapon." IdL at 373, 113 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S. 
Ct. at 1881). The Court then recited uie "plain view" doctrine, to wit: "if police are 
lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is 
immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they 
may seize it without a warrant," and recognized its upholding of the search in Long under 
that doctrine: 
"If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the 
automobile, the officer should, as here, discover contraband other than 
weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the 
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances." 
Id at 374-75, 113 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Long. 463 U.S. at 1050, 103 S. Ct. at 3481). 
Finally, the Court opined that the plain view doctrine had "obvious application" by 
analogy to cases is which the officer discovered contraband through the sense of touch 
during an otherwise lawful search, noting that such a search did not entail any further 
invasion of privacy. Id, at 375, 113 S. Ct. at 2137. The Court summarized its analysis in 
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writing: 
If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an 
object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, 
there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized by the 
officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless 
seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere 
in the plain view context. 
Id at 375-76, 113 S. Ct. at 2137 (emphasis added). In effect, a valid "plain feel" of 
evidence of criminal conduct establishes probable cause to seize it under the Fourth 
Amendment without a warrant. Id at 376, 113 S. Ct. at 2137. 
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court found that although the 
officers properly conducted the Terry frisk, because the Character of the mass of the 
object in the defendant's pocket was not immediately apparent, but had to first be 
identified by "squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating" the contents of the 
defendant's pocket, the plain feel doctrine did not apply. Id, at 377-79, 113 S. Ct. at 
2138-39. 
However, many courts, relying on Dickerson, have uniformly upheld under the 
plain feel doctrine searches yielding contraband where the investigating officer credibly 
testified that, based on his experience, he immediately and without manipulation of the 
object recognized the controlled substance during a valid patdown.16 
16
 A small sampling of cases applying Dickerson and upholding warrantless 
searches on facts comparable to this case is: United States v. Raymond. 152 F.3d 309, 
312 (4th Cir. 1998) (distinctively shaped crack cocaine "cookie" under jacket); United 
States v. Craft. 30 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994) (bulging packages of cocaine taped to 
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Defendant argues that all Sergeant Ashment knew before he removed the 8-ball 
from his pocket was that he felt "a round pliable object." Br. of App. at 20. In light of 
the type of facts necessary for a probable cause determination under Dickerson, defendant 
grossly understates what Sergeant Ashment knew and the trial court plainly recognized: 
In this particular case, and again these are very fact specific and I 
have to go on the basis of everything that I heard. I am going to find in this 
particular case that the officer who did the investigation, did the pat-down 
search was justified in removing the object from the pocket and which was 
later determined to be a controlled substance. I base that on the following 
things: 
Primarily I [sic], I looked to the officer's training and experience, his 
ability to describe exactly in wha terms he conducted the search, what his 
perceptions were during the search based on the timing of the search. And I 
find in this particular case the officer is extensively experienced and trained 
in the area of narcotics such that he would have the knowledge base to be 
able to feel an object in a pocket and in this particular case determine that 
ankles); United States v. Ashley, 37 F.3d 678, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (brown paper bag 
containing crack cocaine in groin area), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1181, 115 S. Ct. 1171 
(1995); Allen v. State. 689 So. 2d 212, 215-17 (Ala. Ct. App. 1995) (dime bag of 
marijuana in pants pocket); State v. Burns, 698 So. 2d 1282, 1284-85 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) 
(54 grams of "a hard, solid substance," powdered cocaine, in two condoms in seat of 
pants); Andrews v. State, 471 S.E.2d 567, 568 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (crack cocaine 
"cookie" in crotch area); People v. Michell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1024-25 (111. 1995) (rock 
cocaine in small baggie in suspect's shirt pocket), affd, 650 N.E.2d 1114 (111. 1995); 
State v. Wonders, 952 P.2d 1351, 1359-60 (Kan. 1998) (baggies of marijuana in front 
pocket); In re Andre W., 584 N.W.2d 474, 479-80 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (crack cocaine in 
socks); State v. Lee, 1998 WL 65478 at 3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (crack cocaine in pill 
bottles in jacket pocket); State v. Smith. 495 S.E.2d 798, 802-03 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) 
(baggy of narcotics in pocket), cert, granted, (Oct. 9, 1998); Garcia v. State, 967 S.W.2d 
902, 907 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (crack pipe in defendant's pocket); In the Matter of L.R., 
975 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (baggie of cocaine in pocket); Welshman v. 
Commonwealth, 502 S.E.2d 122, 129 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (rocks of crack cocaine in 
pocket). 
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because of its size being and l/8th ounce, the shape being in a round 
compressed state inside some kind of packaging, the texture being pliable, 
not a rock in other words, indicated apparently to this officer that it was a 
powdery substance consistent again with a controlled substance. And also 
the location being in the coin pocket of the Levis which is a fairly common 
location to find this type of substance. The location I suppose could 
initially be looked at as probably questionable as to whether you'd find a 
weapon in it. But the officer testified that he has found weapons in that 
area, that they could be small pocket knives, they were still dangerous in 
that type of situation, can be used as a weapon. 
Significant in this case is that the officer testified that he 
immediately recognized this as an object of controlled substance based on 
that the packaging size, feel, the shape location. It did not require any 
manipulation of the object on his part as happened in Minnesota versus 
Dickerson case that went to the Supreme Court. In that case the Supreme 
Court found that by manipulating the object to determine it was a soft 
object and by manipulating it and sliding it around, that went beyond the 
search for weapons. In this case where there's an immediate recognition of, 
of the object as a controlled substance because of its packaging the officer 
was justified in removing it. 
In response to my question of what else it could have been, this 
officer testified I think sincerely that he did not think it could have been 
anything else. And I, I believe that. 
(R. 208:83-85). Defendant does not challenge the trial court's fact finding, which, 
indeed, merely summarizes the specificity of Sergeant Ashment's testimony concerning 
his lengthy and relevant experience and the nature of the object he felt. See Br. of 
Appellee at 5-6, 6 n.4. 
Disregarding the trial court's reliance on Dickerson, defendant cites two pre-
Dickerson cases whose rulings have been fully superceded by Dickerson. Br. of App. at 
20, citing State v. Avala. 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988) (removal of soft object 
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improper in weapons search), cert denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989), and State v. Collins, 
679 P.2d 80, 81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (abrogation pursuant to Dickerson, recognized in 
State v. Sigro. 1995 WL 13556 (Ariz Ct. App. 1995)). 
Because defendant has neither challenged the trial court's findings, nor provided 
any meaning factual or legal analysis in the light of relevant case law, this Court may 
readily decline to review defendant's claim on it merits. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 
960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground that defendant's brief 
"wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support his argument"); State v. Amicone, 
689 P.2d 134 i, 1344 (Utah 1984) (same); State v. Yates 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (same). However, even considering defendant's claim, it is plain that the trial 
court correctly found that Sergeant Ashment was justified under the plain feel doctrine in 
removing the 8-ball from defendant's coin pocket and denying his motion to suppress.17 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS TRIAL COUNSEL ACTED 
REASONABLY IN SECURING THE TESTIMONY OF A CAPABLE 
EXPERT TO REBUT THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESSES, THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant claims a variety of errors by his defense counsel in both Mr. Boyle's 
17
 Notwithstanding the reasonableness of this Court's choosing not to address 
defendant's claim that the cocaine was illegally seized, because Utah has no published 
case expressly acknowledging the applicability of the "plain feel,f doctrine under 
Dickerson, the State believes that a published opinion in this case is warranted. 
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response to the prosecution's calling expert witnesses and in his alleged failure to 
properly obtain and prepare his own expert.18 Specifically, defendant claims that as of the 
close of evidence on the first day of trial, August 13, 1996, Mr. Boyle was not yet aware 
of the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995), and thereby negligently failed 
to object to the prosecutor's not giving him 30-day notice that Sergeant Ashment and 
Lieutenant Zimmerman would be called by the State as experts. Defendant further 
asserts that by seemingly concluding the defense on August 13, Mr. Boyle left the jury 
with the unrebutted testimony of the State's experts, a prejudicial impact which could 
only be cured by the court's declaring a mistrial, a remedy which counsel also failed to 
request. These errors were compounded, defendant argues, by his counsel's failure to 
request sufficient time to first locate an adequate expert and then prepare both himself and 
the expert for trial, resulting in the prosecution's discovery and use at trial of prejudicial, 
privileged information. Br. of App. at 24-30. The record, however, contradicts 
defendant's claims and otherwise supports the trial court's ruling that Mr. Boyle did not 
render ineffective assistance of counsel. 
A. Defendant Bears a Heavy Burden in Showing that His 
Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance. 
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must 
18
 As noted by the trial court and acknowledged by defendant in his new trial 
motion, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is directed only to defendant's 
conviction of possession with intent to distribute (Count I) (R. 209:411). 
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show that counsel's performance was deficient by identifying specific acts or omissions 
which, under the circumstances of the particular case, demonstrate that'" counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin. 
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). Second, defendant must establish the prejudice prong by 
"affirmatively show[ing] that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective 
counsel, the result would have been different." State v. LovelL 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 
1988). "This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial." State v. Wright. 893 P.2d 1113,1119 (Utah App. 1995). 
"Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that counsel's 'performance fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment/ and that counsel's actions 
were not conscious trial strategy." State v. Eilifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citation omitted). Furthermore, "[i]n order to properly challenge the trial court's 
findings of fact on appeal, the complaining party must 'marshal all the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings/" Wright. 893 P.2d at 1119 (citing State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah 
App. 1990) (quoting Scharfv. BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). 
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B. Defendant has Failed to Show that His 
Defense Counsel Performed Ineffectively. 
1. Defense Counsel's Effective Assistance in Requesting a Continuance 
The trial court found that because Sergeant Ashment and Lieutenant Zimmerman 
were police department employees the parties evidently assumed that they would not 
have to be separately qualified as experts, but that the court had surprised the parties by 
ruling otherwise, and, accordingly, the prosecutor had not given the notice required 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995) (See New Trial Ruling, R. 209:454-57 at 
455, attached at Addendum C). The trial court also noted (R. 209:302), and defendant 
acknowledges on appeal, that the prosecutor did not act in bad faith in failing to disclose 
his intended use of experts. Br. of App. at 25-26. Thus, the court observed that Mr. 
Boyle could not have anticipated that the prosecution intended to call an expert, and 
impliedly found that because Mr. Boyle was not in these circumstances unprepared, his 
failure to cite to the correct statute was understandable (R. 209:455-56).19 Moreover, 
the court noted that as soon as Mr. Boyle properly recognized the situation, he 
19
 Although the trial court correctly noted that defense could not have anticipated 
that the prosecution intended to use an expert, counsel could not have been surprised by 
the nature of the State's experts' testimony, since, absent relevant evidence, the 
prosecution would necessarily have had to show that intent to distribute was intrinsic in 
the quantities of drugs defendant was carrying. Indeed, Sergeant Ashment testified at the 
preliminary hearing, where Mr. Boyle was present representing defendant, that based on 
his experience the amount and manner of packaging and lack of paraphernalia was 
consistent with possession with intent to distribute (R. 208:18). Also, while defense 
counsel did not initially cite to the correct statute, the substance of the correct statute was 
the same-a party is entitled to a 30-day notice if an expert is to testify. 
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immediately acted in a proper and diligent manner in requesting the continuance midtrial 
to obtain an expert (R. 209:454-56). 
The record substantially supports the trial court's finding. It is undisputed that the 
prosecution failed to provide the 30-day notice required by section 77-17-13 (R. 
209:455). In response to the prosecutor's request to call Sergeant Ashment and 
Lieutenant Zimmerman as experts (R. 208:143-45, 166-69), Mr. Boyle incorrectly cited 
the 30-day notice requirement for the presentation of an expert with reference to section 
77-14-3 (mental health experts) (R. 208:171-72). However, notwithstanding his 
assertions on appeal that Mr. Boyle's oversight resulted irt the admission of inadmissible 
evidence which should have resulted in the granting of a mistrial, see Br. of App. at 26, 
defendant failed to preserve any aspect of a mistrial claim in arguing his motion of a new 
trial (R. 209:404-26, 435-47). Therefore, State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 
(Utah 1995) (declining to consider mens rea issue not presented to court at preliminary 
hearing) (citing State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Further, 
defendant makes no legal argument that he would have been entitled to exclude the 
State's expert witnesses in the circumstances of this case. See State v. Amicone. 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule on constitutional issue unsupported by 
legal analysis or authority). 
Upon discovery of his error, Mr. Boyle renewed his objection under the correct 
statute, section 77-17-13 (expert in felony cases) after the close of evidence, but sought an 
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available remedy, a continuance (R. 209:290-93). Not only was defense counsel . 
successful in obtaining a continuance for a week to locate an expert, but he was also 
successful in moving the trial court to grant him even more time if necessary (R. 209:296-
301). Thus, defendant's claim that Mr. Boyle was ineffective in failing to obtain 
sufficient time to locate an expert is factually unsupported. Indeed, the trial court noted 
that in granting a continuance for a week it was balancing the fairness of providing 
defendant with an opportunity to obtain an expert against the risk of the jury's forgetting 
the evidence already presented (R. 209:456). With respect to this reasoning, Mr. Boyle 
might reasonably have considered it necessary to obtain an expert with a minimum of 
delay on the theory that the longer he waited to rebut the State's experts, the longer the 
State's case-in-chief would become ingrained in the juror's minds. Defendant failed to 
produce any evidence that any juror was affected by continuance of the trial for a week. 
Thus, as to defendant's preliminary claim regarding his counsel's alleged failure to 
adequately request a continuance, defendant has failed to show that Mr. Boyle either 
acted unprofessionally or that defendant was prejudiced by Mr. Boyle's performance. 
2. Defense Counsel's Effective Assistance Concerning Selection of an 
Expert and Choice to Fully Disclose Expert's Report to Prosecutor 
As to defendant's central claim, that Mr. Boyle failed to prepare for trial an 
adequate expert, and that counsel failed to sufficiently evaluate the expert's testimony 
resulting in the prosecutor's receiving damaging statements, defendant has not only 
substantially failed to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's ruling or cite relevant 
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case law, but has also failed to show that counsel's actions were ill considered or 
prejudicial. 
Defendant cites Templin as his only authority supporting the alleged inadequacy of 
Dr. Hawks as a defense expert and counsel's failure to prepare either himself or Dr. 
Hawks for trial. Br.of App. at 27-28. In Templin. a rape case, the defendant's trial 
counsel failed to investigate two witnesses known to counsel pretrial and whose 
testimony would have significantly contradicted the victim's account of events before the 
alleged rape. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187-88. The court found that in failing to investigate 
prospective witnesses, defendant's trial counsel had performed outside the "wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance . . . because a decision not to investigate cannot be 
considered a tactical decision." Id. at 188. The court also found the decision not to 
investigate prejudicial because the absence of the uninvestigated witnesses deprived the 
defendant of his strongest means of significantly challenging the victim's story, which 
provided the only direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id. 
However, Templin has no application to this case for the obvious reason that Mr. 
Boyle did investigate, finding a credible witness in Dr. Hawks, who ably supported the 
defense theory, to wit: that defendant's history and the variety of differently packaged 
drugs found on defendant's person reasonably suggested that defendant merely possessed 
contraband for his personal use. 
Notwithstanding defendant's assertions of Dr. Hawks' inadequacy as an expert, 
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see Br. of App. at 27, Dr. Hawks qualified as an expert in addiction, the focal point of 
defendant's criminal and medical defense (R. 209:312, 320).20 Having met with 
defendant and reviewed his history (R. 209:320-21), Dr. Hawks testified at length in 
support of his view that defendant had a serious and long-standing alcohol and drug 
problem, particularly involving cocaine in its various forms and marijuana (R. 209:320-
24).21 
20
 At time of trial Dr. Rick Hawks, Ph.D.was a psychologist for Weber Human 
Services with twenty years experience, ten of which involved drug and alcohol abuse (R. 
209:305-07). As a drug and alcohol counselor, Dr. Hawks had maintained a caseload of 
from twenty to sixty drug and alcohol clients with whom he worked full time, one-on-one 
for a few years, and thereafter supervised other drug and alcohol counselors (R. 209:307). 
Thereafter, and subsequent to receiving his doctorate eight years earlier, Dr. ttawks had 
been directed his work primarily to psychological testing and assessment and drug and 
alcohol screenings and consultations (R. 209:307). Dr. Hawks was also certified to 
administer a nationally recognized drug and alcohol screening test, the SASI, and 
recounted a fairly extensive history of teaching drug and alcohol workshops, having 
presented for four or five years on addiction and substance abuse at the State Drug-free 
Conference in Salt Lake and the Utah Alcoholism and Drug State Conference (R. 
209:308). More recently, he had presented at the Weber State University conference on 
addictions and substance abuse and at the Utah Alcoholism and School Conference at the 
University of Utah (R. 209:308). He had also authored textbook chapters on drug and 
alcohol abuse, published articles in national journals on alcohol and drug use issues, and 
reviewed documents for the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, a Washington, D.C. 
based organization (R. 209:309). In his experience as a drug counselor he estimated 
having been involved with a few thousand drug cases (R. 209:310). 
21
 Dr. Hawks testified at to the following pertinent facts and opinions: (1) 
defendant self-reported smoking four to five "premos" (marijuana joint laced with rock 
cocaine) per day, and additionally using powder cocaine (R. 209:325); (2) a "serious" 
drug addict could easily use a couple of 8-balls in two afternoons (R. 209:326-27); (3) 
defendant would not likely have been a dealer because, unlike successful dealers, 
defendant was also an addict, a "plunker" (R. 209:331, 337); (4) unlike successufiil 
dealers, defendant was of significantly low intelligence (R. 209:335-36); (5) defendant 
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In the face of Dr. Hawks' substantially favorable testimony, defendant fails to 
show that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in calling Dr. Hawks as an 
expert witness. First, as the trial court noted, it was to Mr. Boyle's credit that he found an 
expert to testify that certain quantities of drugs indicated personal use (R. 209:457). In 
support, Mr. Boyle testified at the hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial that he 
sought out Dr. Hawks to learn whether the amounts of narcotics found on defendant were 
consistent with personal use as opposed to dealing, and that after defendant was evaluated 
and after reviewing the report and meeting with Dr. Hawks several times during the 
continuance, he found Dr. Hawks' conclusion to be beneficial to defendant (R. 209:415-
16,421, 431-32). Additionally, Dr. Hawks appeared very confident about his 
assessment (R. 209:431-32). Also, by putting Dr. Hawks on as an expert, Mr. Boyle was 
able to get defendant's statements into evidence, to wit: that defendant was a drug user 
but not a dealer, without actually calling defendant to testify and subjecting him to cross-
examination (R. 209:433-34). 
Second, as the trial court also noted, defendant failed to show that any other 
reported that he had used some of the cocaine found on his person (R. 209:337); (6) many 
of his (Dr. Hawks') clients had carried as much cocaine as defendant had for only their 
personal use (R. 209:339); (7) addicts who were cooking their own rock cocaine would 
necessarily possess its precursor, powdered cocaine (R. 209:340); (8) contrary to 
Lieutenant Zimmerman's testimony, serious addicts, needing to satisfy their craving for a 
"high," would snort powdered cocaine if rock cocaine was not available (R. 209:340); 
and (9) if someone wanted to do a "premo," they would also have to be in possession of 
marijuana (R. 209:341). 
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witness would have testified more favorably to defendant (R. 209:446, 457). In support, 
Mr. Boyle testified that although he had been told that he might look to ex-police officers 
as appropriate experts, the Weber County Public Defenders Office did not know of an 
expert that would support the theory of the defense, nor did he recall that the names of 
other experts were suggested to him, and he had difficulty in finding somebody (R. 
209:416, 418-19, 440). In fact, defendant failed to produce any witness at the hearing or 
show that any witness might have testified more favorably (R. 209:446-47). Indeed, 
apart from the damaging information provided to the prosecution, that defendant had once 
expressed a desire to be a drug dealer, defendant acknowledged that "Mr. [sic] Hawks is 
a great witness-no one disputes that his testimony was not helpful," a view also echoed 
by the trial court (R. 209:446, 457).22 In sum, not only has defendant has failed to 
marshal the facts supporting the trial court's conclusion, but he has also failed to show 
that his trial counsel performed deficiently in locating and then calling Dr. Hawks to 
testify. 
While defendant has alleged a barrage of claimed instances of his trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness, the heart of his argument is that by failing to adequately prepare Dr. 
22
 In further derogation of defendant's claim that Dr. Hawks ultimately provided 
damaging testimony, defendant, in support of his motion for a new trial, sent letters to 
jurors asking whether Dr. Hawks' testimony impacted them, and only one juror 
responded, indicating only that he recalled that Dr. Hawks testified about defendant's 
drug addictions (R. 209:405-07). But see rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(precluding any statement as to the effect of anything influencing a juror's assent to a 
verdict). 
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Hawks and review his report, Mr. Boyle negligently provided prejudicial, privileged 
information to the prosecutor. Br. of App. at 13,27-30. In particular, defendant correctly 
states that the report disclosed that defendant once had a goal to become rich by selling 
drugs for profit and that defendant had a personality disorder conducive to lying, 
information which the prosecutor elicited on cross-examination and argued in closing (R. 
209:349-52, 394). However, in the circumstances of this case, the necessary revelation of 
such material did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
As noted earlier,M [defendant has the burden of demonstrating that counsel's 
'performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment/ and 
that counsel's actions were not conscious trial strategy." Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174. 
"[The reviewing] court will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, 
however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect." State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 
814 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v.Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461 465 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; State v. PascuaL 804 P.2d 553, 556 
(Utah App. 1991)). See Tennvson. 850 P.2d at 468 (noting that given Strickland's strong 
presumption of competence, "we need only articulate some plausible strategic explanation 
for counsel's behavior"); State v. Cosev. 873 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994) ("Even when trial counsel allows the ultimate selection of a 
juror who initially appeared biased on voir dire, 'courts deny the ineffective assistance 
claim unless counsel's actions could not conceivably constitute legitimate trial tactics/") 
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(quoting Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 469). 
In State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990), 
a sexual abuse and sodomy case, the defendant alleged violations of due process and 
ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from his counsel's failure to object to out-of-
court testimony of child witnesses and to the testimony of child psychologists whose 
interview techniques allegedly contaminated all of the child witness testimony. Bullock. 
792 P.2d at 157. The court found that, although the evidence complained of may have 
been inadmissible, because trial counsel could reasonably have concluded that there was 
little chance of keeping the testimony of the children out of evidence, counsel was not 
ineffective in focusing his efforts on attacking instead a less sympathetic adult witnesses, 
such as the child psychologists. IcL at 159-60. C£ Morales v. United States. 25 F. 
Supp.2d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (recognizing that trial counsel necessarily must weigh 
costs against benefits in pursuing investigation). 
In similar fashion, defense counsel in this case might reasonably have concluded 
that, given that he had little hope of preventing the prosecution from viewing Dr. Hawks' 
complete report, the benefits of Dr. Hawks' testimony clearly outweighed the report's 
damaging information.23 In this regard, defense counsel testified that prior to giving the 
23
 Defendant argues, without the support of any authority or legal analysis, that 
defense counsel should have redacted Dr. Hawks report to prevent the prosecutor from 
viewing the prejudicial information. Br. of App. at 13, 27. However, it would appear that 
section 77-17-13(3) contemplates disclosure of an unexpurgated report to opposing 
counsel. Rather, upon receipt of the report, defense counsel might have made a motion in 
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prosecutor the report, he read it through, including the reference to defendant's 
maintaining the belief about becoming wealthy by selling drugs on the street for profit 
and defendant's having both the motivation and opportunity to dissimulate (R. 209:421-
23,425). However, because the references were to events in 1987, he was not disinclined 
to call Dr. Hawks on that account (R. 209:425). Moreover, Mr. Boyle observed that the 
report also contained numerous references that the quantities of drugs at issue could have 
instead been for personal use, a point which Dr. Hawks testified to at trial (R. 209:426-
27). Additionally, Mr. Boyle acknowledged that Sergeant Ashment and Lieutenant 
Zimmerman had presented themselves as ci edible, articulate witnesses and that he had no 
other resource besides Dr. Hawks by which to advance the defense's theory of the case, 
other than by raising doubts through cross-examination of the State's witnesses (R. 
209:427,430-31). 
In sum, Mr. Boyle rendered reasonable professional service to defendant. Defense 
counsel found a qualified witness who effectively testified in support of the theory of the 
defense. Because counsel was aware of the somewhat prejudicial information in the 
report before disclosing it to the prosecution and consciously chose to disclose it, as he 
was required to do by statute, his decision was a necessary component of reasonable trial 
strategy, regardless of the result. See Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah), cert. 
limine to prevent the prosecution from using damaging statements under rule 403 or 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. However, defendant fails to develop any legal argument 
ascribing such error to defense counsel. 
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denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1996)C'[W]henever there is ;a legitimate exercise of professional 
judgment in the choice of trial strategy, the fact that it did not produce the expected result 
does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel/") (quoting Bullock. 791 P.2d at 160). 
Moreover, as noted above, there is no evidence that the report was instrumental in the 
jury's verdict or that any other expert could have testified effectively without also 
divulging compromising information about defendant's past. 
C. Defendant Has Failed to Show That He was Prejudiced 
By His Trial Counsel's Disclosure of His Expert's Report 
The only prejudice defendant asserts on appeal as a result of his defense counsel's 
alleged ineffectiveness is that in the face of damaging, but merely speculative, opinions of 
the State's experts, Mr. Boyle provided the jury with "a confession from Mr. Sosa that 
said selling drugs was a good way to make money." Br. of App. at 30.24 However, 
defendant again fails to show that this statement was so prejudicial that this Court should 
lose confidence in the verdict. 
After the prosecutor elicited from Dr. Hawks the statements that defendant had 
expressed a wish to sell drugs for profit and that defendant had both a motivation and 
history that would support lying (R. 209:349-51), Mr. Boyle elicited from Dr. Hawks that 
after careful examination Dr. Hawks saw nothing in any of the reports since 1987 
24
 Similarly, in his motion for a new trial, defendant limited his claims of 
prejudice exclusively to the damaging statements disclosed to the prosecution in Dr. 
Hawks' report (R. 209:442-47). 
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indicating that defendant wanted to achieve success by selling drugs (R. 209:354-55). Dr. 
Hawks also stated that although the findings were mixed, on a whole the tests indicated 
that defendant was telling the truth about his drug use (R. 209:355). 
However, in spite of Dr. Hawks' testimony, there was the substantial testimony of 
officers impressively experienced in narcotics enforcement that the various amounts of 
drugs, their manner of packaging, the economics of drug use, the heavy drug user's 
predilection for only a preferred drug, and the absence of drug paraphernalia in the car 
indicated that defendant was not likely a drug user, but rather a drug dealer (R. 208:188-
219). In sum, there is no reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had defense not 
utilized Dr. Hawks'. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
convictions be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A/ day of February, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
' KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Kent E. Snider, Weber County Public 
Defenders Assoc, attorneys for defendant, 2564 Washington Blvd., Suite #200, Ogden, 
Utah 84401, this ft day of February, 1999. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1995) Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for 
dangerous weapon - Grounds. 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably 
believes he or any other person is in danger. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995) Expert testimony generally - Notice 
requirements. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing, the 
party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as 
soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before 
the hearing. Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the 
expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not 
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that opinion, 
the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing party a 
written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient to give 
the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, 
followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when available. 
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party 
receiving notice shall provide notice to the other party of witnesses whom 
the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the 
name and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. 
If available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If the rebuttal 
expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform 
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event 
the rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal 
witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated 
rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to 
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by 
any rebuttal expert when available. 
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow prep^^ .^on to m< n the testimony. If the court 
finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on 
the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate 
sanctions. 
Rule 606, Utah Rules of Evidence—Competency of juror as witness. 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before 
that jury in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is 
called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to 
object out of the presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the 
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the 
effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that 
a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may 
a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a 
matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be 
received for these purposes. 
ADDENDUM B 
1 (TAPE TURNED OFF) 
2 COURT'S RULING 
3 THE JUDGE: Okay. First addressing the 
4 issue of the pat-down search pursuant to the Terry 
5 doctrine. The standard that applies is whether 
6 there's a reasonable, if the officer who does the 
7 search has a reasonable suspicion that the person 
8 is armed and dangerous. In this case-- And a 
9 pat-down is limited to the pat-down for a search of 
10 weapons based on that belief. 
11 In this case I believe the officer did 
12 have a reasonable suspicion based on the 
13 information given to him by the officer who made 
14 the initial stop. First, he was under the 
15 understanding there had been a delay in pulling 
16 over. During the delay there was passing back and 
17 forth which appeared to be suspicious at any rate, 
18 perhaps indicating they were hiding something or 
19 passing something back and forth between each 
20 other. 
21 At the time of the stop the officer making 
22 the initial stop views an ammo, ammunition box in 
23 plain view. It was empty but he determined based 
24 on his experience that it in fact was an ammunition 
25 II box for a 22 rifle. However, as testified that 
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1 ammunition could be used in something smaller than 
2 a long riflef it could be used in a smaller 
3 firearem which again justified the search of the 
4 person for concealed, possibly a concealed loaded 
5 weapon* An additional factor taking into account 
6 is the false information that was given to the 
7 officer who made the initial stop regarding the 
8 name of the passenger, at least a suspicion that 
9 there was false information. 
10 All those factors taken into, into 
11 consideration, considering it was on the side of 
12 the road, that the officer felt there was either a 
13 gun in the car or on the person of one of the two, 
14 and in giving that information to the backup 
15 officer that backup officer was justified in 
16 following the direction and request to search the 
17 defendant in this case who was the passenger in the 
18 vehicle. 
19 I would consider this based on what I've 
20 heard a fairly high level of potential danger. And 
21 I don't think we have to, that an officer has to 
22 wait until the gun is either used or brought out to 
23 make that determination. Without going further 
24 into that I think it really speaks to the obvious 
25 II on that. 
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1 The next question is during the Terry 
2 stop, search, the pat-down for weapons which again 
3 is limited to a pat-down for weapons, did it go 
4 beyond the scope of what a Terry search was 
5 designed for? 
6 In this particular case, and again these 
7 are very fact specific and I have to go on the 
8 basis of everything that I heard. I am going to 
9 find in this particular case that the officer who 
10 did the investigation, did the pat-down search was 
11 justified in removing the object from the pocket 
12 and yhich was later determined to be a controlled 
13 substance. I base that on the following things: 
14 Primarily I, I looked to the officer's 
15 training and experience, his ability to describe 
16 exactly in what terms he conducted the search, what 
17 his perceptions were during the search based on the 
18 timing of the search. And I find in this 
19 particular case the officer is extensively 
20 experienced and trained in the area of narcotics 
21 such that he would have the knowledge base to be 
22 able to feel an object in a pocket and in this 
23 particular case determine that because of its size 
24 being an l/8th ounce, the shape being in a round 
25 I] compressed state inside some kind of packaging, the 
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1 texture being pliable, not a rock in other words, 
2 indicated apparently to this officer that it was a 
3 powdery substance consistent again with a 
4 controlled substance* And also the location being 
5 in the coin pocket of the Levis is which is a 
6 fairly common location to find this type of 
7 substance* The location I suppose could initially 
8 be looked at as probably questionable as to whether 
9 you'd find a weapon in it* But the officer 
10 testified that he has found weapons in that area, 
11 that they could be small pocket knives, they were 
12 still dangerous in m a t type of situation, can be 
13 used as a weapon* 
14 Significant in this case is that the 
15 officer testified that he immediately recognized 
16 this as an object of controlled substance based on 
17 that the packaging size, feel, the shape, 
18 location. It did not require any manipulation of 
19 the object on his part as happened in the Minnesota 
20 versus Dickerson case that went to the Supreme 
2 1 II Court. In that case the Supreme Court found that 
22 II by manipulating the object to determine it was a 
23 || soft object and by manipulating it and sliding it 
24 || around, that went beyond the search for weapons* 
25 II In this case where there's an immediate recognition 
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1 of, of the object as a controlled substance because 
2 of its packaging the officer was justified in 
3 removing it. 
4 In response to my question of what else it 
5 could have been, this officer testified I think 
6 sincerely that he did not think it could have been 
7 anything else. And I, I believe that* 
8 The question is whether the doctrine of 
9 plain view carries over into plain feel. I'm 
10 basing my ruling on the case submitted of Minnesota 
11 versus Dickerson, a Supreme Court case which says 
12 || that the Supreme Court has adopted a plain feel 
13 doctrine but it is one that would be limited in use 
14 to something that is immediately apparent to the 
15 officer based on their experience. It has to be a 
16 believable kind of situation. There can't be any 
17 manipulation of the object to get a better idea of 
18 what it might be. 
19 This is an unusual case I think. And they 
20 all are actually when it comes right down to it. 
21 And they're difficult cases because they're not 
22 absolutely clear-cut and that's why I wanted to 
23 hear what the officer had to say. I don't believe 
24 the officer had any time to discuss this with the 
25 I) prosecutor or be briefed on what to say and he 
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1 answered the questions exactly as I would have 
2 expected someone to have answered them if they had 
3 in fact experienced it as he did which was an 
4 immediate sense, sense that this was a controlled 
5 substance based on his experience. 
6 Therefore, I'm going to deny the motion to 
7 suppress based on those reasons and--
8 MR. HEWARD: We already have trial and 
9 and pretrial dates set. 
10 THE JUDGE: We do have a, we do have it 
11 set. I don't know if that's going to change 
12 things. 
13 MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, just one quick 
14 clarification as to State versus Iaya. 
15 THE JUDGE: Oh, I did look at that case 
16 and I appreciate you reminding me of that. I think 
17 this is distinguishable from that case because in 
18 that case the Court of Appeals made a fairly broad 
19 statement that soft objects can't be retrieved 
20 during a pat-down search because they, they are not 
21 weapons. But that case involved 96 balloons with 
22 heroine inside. It was a soft object in a, in a 
23 large pocket in a jacket. 
24 Arguably I'm going, taking it one step 
25 II beyond. Arguably something like that could have 
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1 been anything. It could have been a large glove, a 
2 set of gloves, it could have been any number of 
3 things. There was no detail given in the case or 
4 apparently by the testimony of the officer as to 
5 what other things it could have been, what it felt 
6 like. I'm assuming they just felt something 
7 suspicious and thought it might be drugs and that's 
8 why it was not allowed. But the Court does make 
9 reference to soft objects in general not being 
10 allowed. 
11 I think this case is distinguishable in 
12 that we have an immediate recognition of it ha^ed 
13 on size, location, feel without any further 
14 manipulation. And again, I'm basing it on what I 
15 would consider the controlling case of Minnesota 
16 versus Dickerson which recognizes a plain feel 
17 doctrine in very limited cases I believe. But I 
18 think this is probably one of them so that's what 
19 I'm basing it on. I don't think it falls into the 
20 category of a general soft object which I think was 
21 the Court of Appeals' focus. And that's, that's 
22 the basis for it. 
23 I have to talk to you about something else 
24 and you may want to talk to your client again, but 
25 (J it's about a different case. Maybe I could have 
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1 both of you come back and talk to me for just a 
2 minute. 
3 MR. HEWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
4 II WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
PAGE 8 8 
ADDENDUM C 
1 that was sent out to all the jurors, Your Honor. 
2 MR. HEWARD: We would so stipulate and we 
3 I don't have any objection to those being admitted. 
4 MR. SNIDER: And I would just ask that 
5 the juror's address and name be stricken from this 
6 letter, Your Honor. 
7 THE JUDGE: All right. We'll eliminate 
8 that. 
9 MR. SNIDER: Thank you. 
10 THE JUDGE: Those will be received also. 
11 MR. SNIDER: We're ready to submit it, 
12 Your Honor. 
13 THE JUDGE: All right. A, well first of 
14 all I'm going to deny the motion for a new trial 
15 and I'll give you my reasons now. 
16 First of all, I do remember this because 
17 it was a novel experience for me to have this 
18 argument raised during trial that the State hadn't 
19 given notice of the expert per the statute. In 
20 fact, I think Mr. Boyle was probably, at least in 
21 my experience was the first one that's ever raised 
22 that and in fact maybe set a new standard for 
23 practice for defense counsel in Weber County in 
24 that regard because it's been raised since. And I 
25 think everybody, everyone has been more mindful. 
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1 Not everyone but, you know, I think the other side 
2 has been more mindful of the rule of giving notice 
3 of experts within 30 days. And I was, I felt that 
4 was a novel and new approach. I thought it showed 
5 a great deal of, of diligence on his part to not 
6 only recognize that but also to pursue it. Because 
7 1 haven't had it come up before and I haven't had 
8 it come up since where someone has, in midtrial has 
9 asked for a continuance to obtain an expert. 
10 This is also a case where I might add it 
11 wasn't due to his lack of preparedness in the 
12 case. Because as I recall, and I believe I'm 
13 correct, that it was for that very reason because 
14 the State hadn't given notice. And I deemed-- And 
15 I think they were under the assumption perhaps that 
16 the detectives were not deemed experts because they 
17 were employees of the police that they wouldn't 
18 need to be, they wouldn't need to give notice. But 
19 I ruled the opposite of that somewhat to their 
20 surprise. And I don't know that, I don't know that 
21 either one of them expected me to rule that way 
22 necessarily. 
23 So I wouldn't have expected Mr. Boyle to 
24 have anticipated that they were going to use an 
25 expert because they didn't designate one and, and 
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1 there was no ruling that these people were in fact 
2 experts until I actually made it during the 
3 trial. 
4 II So I don't think it would be fair to 
5 characterize his situation as being not prepared 
6 for that. And in fact when he realized it he 
7 immediately made an issue of it and convinced me to 
8 grant him a continuance to obtain, at least to look 
9 for another expert. And he wasn't committed to 
10 actually using another expert at that time but 
11 wanted the opportunity to explore that possibility. 
12 I didn't give him a long time to do that as he 
13 pointed out on the stand. We had a jury that was 
14 impaneled and they had heard part of the case. In 
15 my estimation, although I balanced the fairness to 
16 the defendant of trying to come up with an expert 
17 at, at a late date with having a jury that had 
18 heard part of the evidence and may forget a good 
19 portion of it if too much time elapsed between that 
20 time. 
21 So I'd find that I don't believe that 
22 Mr. Boyle's practice fell below the objective 
23 standard of representation and reasonableness under 
24 the circumstances of this case for those reasons. 
25 Furthermore, I don't believe that the 
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1 evidence necessarily prejudiced the outcome. The 
2 testimony is that this was not a strong case to 
3 begin with- There's no evidence that another 
4 expert would have, he would have been able to 
5 obtain another expert that might have said 
6 otherwise. And furthermore, there's no evidence to 
7 indicate that another expert might have, might not 
8 have in fact disagreed with Dr. Hawks' assessment 
9 that this was for personal use. 
10 Frankly it was, I've never heard an expert 
11 used to testify regarding that on the defense 
12 before and as I said, I haven't heard of an expert 
13 being used to testify since that certain quantities 
14 were for personal use that the defense has 
15 offered. In fact I think again, I think it is to 
16 his credit that he found anybody that was willing 
17 to say that under the circumstances of this case. 
18 And I, I'm not trying to speculate on, on what 
19 might have been but I think it, it does go to the 
20 issue of prejudice and that, that would not have 
21 prejudiced the case since he did get some positive 
22 testimony from him. 
23 Essentially that's, those are my reasons 
24 for denying the motion. 
25 MR. HEWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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1 THE JUDGE: We can go off the record 
2 (TAPE TURNED OFF) 
3 WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
PAGE 4 58 
